We define the independent natural extension of two local models for the general case of infinite spaces, using both sets of desirable gambles and conditional lower previsions. In contrast to Miranda and Zaffalon (2015), we adopt Williams-coherence instead of Walley-coherence. We show that our notion of independent natural extension always exists-whereas theirs does not-and that it satisfies various convenient properties, including factorisation and external additivity.
Introduction
When probabilities are imprecise, in the sense that they are only partially specified, it is no longer clear what it means for two variables to be independent (Couso et al., 1999) . One approach is to apply the standard notion of independence to every element of some set of probability measures. The alternative, called epistemic independence, is to define independence as mutual irrelevance, in the sense that receiving information about one of the variables will not effect our uncertainty model for the other. The advantage of this intuitive alternative is that it has a much wider scope: since epistemic independence is expressed in terms of uncertainty models instead of probabilities, it can easily be applied to a variety of such models, including non-probabilistic ones; we here consider sets of desirable gambles and conditional lower previsions.
When an assessment of epistemic independence is combined with local uncertainty models, it leads to a unique corresponding joint uncertainty model that is called the independent natural extension. If the variables involved can take only a finite number of values, this independent natural extension always exists, and it then satisfies various convenient properties that allow for the design of efficient algorithms (de Cooman et al., 2011; de Cooman and Miranda, 2012) . If the variables involved take values in an infinite set, the situation becomes more complicated. On the one hand, for the specific case of lower probabilities, Vicig (2000) managed to obtain results that resemble the finite case. On the other hand, for the more general case of lower previsions, Miranda and Zaffalon (2015) recently found that the independent natural extension may not even exist.
Our present contribution generalises the results of Vicig (2000) to the case of conditional lower previsions, using sets of desirable gambles as an intermediate step. The key technical difference with Miranda and Zaffalon (2015) is that we use Williams-coherence instead of Walley-coherence. This difference turns out to be crucial because our notion of independent natural extension always exists. Furthermore, as we will see, it satisfies the same convenient properties that are known to hold in the finite case, including factorisation and external additivity.
We use N to denote the natural numbers without zero and let N 0 := N ∪ {0}. R is the set of real numbers and Q is the set of rational numbers. Sign restrictions are imposed with subscripts. For example, we let R >0 be the set of positive real numbers and let Q ≥0 be the set of non-negative rational numbers. The extended real numbers are denoted by R := R ∪ {−∞, +∞}.
For any non-empty set X , the power set of X -the set of all subsets of X -is denoted by P(X ), and we let P / 0 (X ) := P(X ) \ { / 0} be the set of all non-empty subsets of X . Elements of P(X ) are called events. A set of events B ⊆ P(X ) is called a field if it is non-empty and closed with respect to complements and finite intersections and unions. If it is also closed with respect to countable intersections and unions, it is called a sigma field. A partition of X is a set B ⊆ P / 0 (X ) of pairwise disjoint non-empty subsets of X whose union is equal to X . We also adopt the notational trick of identifying X with the set of atoms {{x} : x ∈ X }, which allows us to regard X as a partition of X .
A bounded real-valued function on X will be called a gamble on X . The set of all gambles on X is denoted by G (X ), the set of all non-negative gambles on X is denoted by G ≥0 (X ), and we let G >0 (X ) := G ≥0 (X ) \ {0} be the set of all non-negative non-zero gambles. For any set of gambles A ⊆ G (X ), we let
and
Indicators are a particular type of gamble. For any A ∈ P(X ), the corresponding indicator I A of A is a gamble in G (X ), defined for all x ∈ X by I A (x) := 1 if x ∈ A and I A (x) := 0 otherwise. Finally, for any B ⊆ P / 0 (X ), we will also require the notion of a non-negative B-measurable gamble, which we define as a uniform limit of simple B-measurable gambles.
Definition 1 Let B ⊆ P / 0 (X ). We call g ∈ G ≥0 (X ) a simple B-measurable gamble if there are c 0 ∈ R ≥0 , n ∈ N 0 and, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, c i ∈ R ≥0 and B i ∈ B, such that g = c 0 + ∑ n i=1 c i I B i .
Definition 2 Let B ⊆ P / 0 (X ). A gamble g ∈ G ≥0 (X ) is B-measurable if it is a uniform limit of non-negative simple B-measurable gambles, in the sense that there is a sequence {g n } n∈N of simple B-measurable gambles in G ≥0 (X ) such that lim n→+∞ sup |g − g n | = 0.
Readers that are familiar with the concepts of simple and measurable functions that are common in measure theory will observe some similarities. However, there are also some important differences. On the one hand, our definitions are more restrictive: we only consider bounded nonnegative functions, Definition 1 requires that the coefficients c i are non-negative, and Definition 2 considers uniform limits instead of pointwise limits. On the other hand, our definitions are more general because we allow for B to be any subset of P / 0 (X ). Nevertheless, if B ∪ { / 0} is a sigma field, we have the following equivalence.
Proposition 3 Consider any B ⊆ P / 0 (X ) such that B * := B ∪ { / 0} is a sigma field. Then for any g ∈ G ≥0 (X ), g is B * -measurable in the measure-theoretic sense (Nielsen, 1997, Definition 10.1 
) if and only if it is B-measurable in the sense of Definition 2.
The proof of this result is based on the following sufficient condition for B-measurability, which provides a convenient tool for establishing the B-measurability of a given function. In particular, it implies that every non-negative gamble is P / 0 (X )-measurable.
Proposition 4 Let B ⊆ P / 0 (X ) and g ∈ G ≥0 (X ). If, for all r ∈ Q ≥0 , the set {x ∈ X : g(x) ≥ r} is a finite union of pairwise disjoint events in B ∪ {X , / 0}, then g is B-measurable.
Corollary 5 Every g ∈ G ≥0 (X ) is P / 0 (X )-measurable.
Modelling Uncertainty
A subject's uncertainty about a variable X that takes values x in some non-empty set X can be mathematically represented in various ways. The most popular such method is perhaps probability theory, but it is by no means the only one, nor is it the most general one. In order for our results to have a broader scope, we here adopt the frameworks of sets of desirable gambles and conditional lower previsions.
The main aim of this section is to provide an overview of the basic technical aspects of these frameworks, as these will be essential to the rest of the paper. Notably, we do not impose any constraints on the cardinality of X : it may be finite, countably infinite or uncountably infinite. Connections with other-perhaps better known-models for uncertainty, including probability theory, will be discussed briefly at the end.
The basic idea behind sets of desirable gambles is to model a subject's uncertainty about X by considering his attitude towards gambles-bets-on X . In particular, we consider the gambles f ∈ G (X ) that he finds desirable, in the sense that he is willing to engage in a transaction where, once the actual value x ∈ X of X is known, he will receive a-possibly negative-reward f (x) in some linear utility scale. Even more so, he prefers these desirable gambles over the status quo, that is, over not conducting any transaction at all. A set of desirable gambles is called coherent if it satisfies the following rationality requirements.
Definition 6 A coherent set of desirable gambles D on X is a subset of G (X ) such that, for any two gambles f , g ∈ G (X ) and any non-negative real number λ ∈ R >0 :
Despite their simplicity, sets of desirable gambles offer a surprisingly powerful framework for modelling uncertainty; see for example (Walley, 2000) and (Quaeghebeur, 2014) . For our present purposes though, all we need for now is Definition 6.
Conditional lower previsions also model a subject's uncertainty about X by considering his attitude towards gambles on X . However, in this case, instead of considering sets of gambles, we consider the prices at which a subject is willing to buy these gambles. Let
be the set of all pairs ( f , B), where f is a gamble on X and B is a non-empty subset of X -an event. A conditional lower prevision is then defined as follows.
Definition 7 A conditional lower prevision P on C ⊆ C (X ) is a map
For any ( f , B) in the domain C , the lower prevision P( f |B) of f conditional on B is interpreted as a subject's supremum price µ for buying f , under the condition that the transaction is called off when B does not happen-if x / ∈ B. In other words, P( f |B) is the supremum value of µ for which he is willing to engage in a transaction where he receives f (x) − µ if x ∈ B and zero otherwise, and furthermore prefers this transaction to the status quo.
It is also possible to consider conditional upper previsions P( f |B), which are interpreted as infimum selling prices. However, since selling f for µ is equivalent to buying − f for −µ, we have that P( f |B) = −P(− f |B). For that reason, we will mainly focus on conditional lower previsions. Unconditional lower previsions correspond to the special case where B = X for all ( f , B) ∈ C ; we then use the shorthand notation P( f ) := P( f |X ) and call P( f ) the lower prevision of f . Similarly, we refer to P( f ) := P( f |X ) as the upper prevision of f .
Because of their interpretation in terms of buying prices for gambles, a particularly intuitive way to obtain a conditional lower prevision P is to derive it from a set of gambles D. In particular, for every D ⊆ G (X ), we let
A conditional lower prevision is then called coherent if can be derived from a coherent set of desirable gambles in this way.
Definition 8 A conditional lower prevision P on a domain C ⊆ C (X ) is coherent if there is a coherent set of desirable gambles D on X such that P coincides with P D on C .
This definition of coherence is heavily inspired by the work of Williams (1975 Williams ( , 2007 . The only two minor differences are that our rationality axioms on D are slightly different from his, and that we do not impose any structure on the domain C . Nevertheless, when the domain C satisfies the structural constraints in (Williams, 2007) , Definition 8 is equivalent to that of Williams. More generally, as the following result establishes, it is equivalent to the structure-free notion of Williamscoherence that was developed by Pelessoni and Vicig (2009).
Proposition 9 A conditional lower prevision P on C ⊆ C (X ) is coherent if and only if it is realvalued and, for all n ∈ N 0 and all choices of λ 0 , . . . , λ n ∈ R ≥0 and ( f 0 , B 0 ), . . . , ( f n , B n ) ∈ C :
where we let B := ∪ n i=0 B i .
The advantage of this alternative characterisation is that it is expressed directly in terms of lower previsions. Nevertheless, we consider Equation (4) to be less intuitive than Definition 8, which is why we prefer the latter.
From a mathematical point of view, Definition 8 also has the advantage that it allows for simple and elegant proofs of some well-known results. For example, it follows trivially from our definition of coherence that the domain of a coherent conditional lower prevision can be arbitrarily extended while preserving coherence, whereas deriving this result directly from Equation 4 is substantially more involved; see for example the proof of (Pelessoni and Vicig, 2009, Proposition 1). Furthermore, our definition also allows for a very natural derivation of the so-called natural extension of P, that is, the most conservative extension of P to C (X ). In particular, instead of having to derive this natural extension directly, Definition 8 allows us to rephrase this problem into a closely related yet simpler question: what is the smallest coherent set of desirable gambles D on X such that P D coincides with P on C ? The answer turns out to be surprisingly simple.
Proposition 10 Consider a coherent conditional lower prevision P on C ⊆ C (X ) and let
Then E (P) is a coherent set of desirable gambles on X and P E (P) coincides with P on C . Furthermore, for any other coherent set of desirable gambles D on X such that P D coincides with P on C , we have that
Abstracting away some technical details, the reason why this result holds should be intuitively clear. First, since conditional lower previsions are interpreted as called-off supremum buying prices, we see that the gambles in A P should be desirable. Combined with D1-D3, the desirability of the gambles in E (P) then follows.
Since smaller sets of desirable gambles lead to more conservative-pointwise smaller-lower previsions, we conclude that the natural extension of P is given by
The following proposition provides a formal statement of this result.
Proposition 11 Let P be a coherent conditional lower prevision on C ⊆ C (X ). Then E, as defined by Equation (6), is the pointwise smallest coherent conditional lower prevision on C (X ) that coincides with P on C .
All in all, we conclude that Definition 8 provides an intuitive as well as mathematically convenient characterisation of Williams-coherence that is furthermore equivalent to the structure-free version of Pelessoni and Vicig (2009) . From a technical point of view, this equivalence will not be important further on, since all of our arguments will be based on the connection with sets of desirable gambles. From a practical point of view though, this equivalence is highly important, because the Williams-coherent conditional lower previsions that are considered in (Pelessoni and Vicig, 2009) are well-known to include as special cases a variety of other uncertainty models, including expectations, lower expectations, probabilities, lower probabilities and belief functions; lower probabilities, for example, can be obtained by restricting the domain of P to indicators. For that reason, all of our results can be immediately applied to these special cases as well. A detailed treatment of these special cases, however, does not fit within the page constraints of this contribution, and therefore falls beyond the scope our present work.
Epistemic Independence
Having introduced our main tools for modelling uncertainty, the next step towards developing a notion of independent natural extension is to agree on what we mean by independence. Within the context of lower previsions, there are basically two main options.
The first approach, which we will not consider here, is to interpret lower previsions as lower expectations, that is, as tight lower bounds on the expectations that correspond to some set of probability measures, and to then impose the usual notion of independence on each of the probability measures in that set. This approach has the advantage of being familiar, but is restricted in scope because it can only be applied to uncertainty models that are expressed in terms of probabilities.
The second approach, which is the one that we will adopt here, is to regard independence as an assessment of mutual irrelevance. In particular, we say that X 1 and X 2 are independent if our uncertainty model for X 1 is not affected by conditioning on information about X 2 , and vice versa. This definition can easily be applied to a probability measure, and then yields the usual notion of independence. However, and that is what makes this approach powerful and intuitive, it can just as easily be applied to lower previsions, sets of desirable gambles, or any other type of uncertainty model. This type of independence is usually referred to as epistemic independence. The aim of this section is to formalize this concept for the case of two variables, in terms of sets of desirable gambles and conditional lower previsions.
Consider two variables X 1 and X 2 where, for every i ∈ {1, 2}, X i takes values x i in a non-empty set X i that may be uncountably infinite, and let X := (X 1 , X 2 ) be the corresponding joint variable that takes values x := (x 1 , x 2 ) in X 1 × X 2 . In this context, whenever convenient, we will identify B ∈ P / 0 (X 1 ) with B × X 2 and B ∈ P / 0 (X 2 ) with X 1 × B. Similarly, for any i ∈ {1, 2}, we will identify f ∈ G (X i ) with its cylindrical extension to G (X 1 × X 2 ), defined by
In order to make this explicit, we will then often denote this cylindrical extension by f (X i ). In this way, for example, for any f ∈ G (X 2 ) and B ∈ P(X 1 ), we can write f (X 2 )I B (X 1 ) to denote a gamble in G (X 1 × X 2 ) whose value in (x 1 , x 2 ) is equal to f (x 2 ) if x 1 ∈ B and equal to zero otherwise. Using these conventions, for any set of gambles D on X 1 × X 2 , we define the marginal models
and, for any events B 1 ∈ P / 0 (X 1 ) and B 2 ∈ P / 0 (X 2 ), the conditional models
Conditioning and marginalisation both preserve coherence: if D is a coherent set of desirable gambles on X 1 × X 2 , then marg 1 (D) and marg 1 (D⌋B 2 ) are coherent sets of desirable gambles on X 1 , and marg 2 (D) and marg 2 (D⌋B 1 ) are coherent sets of desirable gambles on X 2 . That being said, let us now recall our informal definition of epistemic independence, which was that the uncertainty model for X 1 is not affected by conditioning on information about X 2 , and vice versa. In the context of sets of desirable gambles, this can now be formalized as follows:
The only thing that is left to specify are the conditioning events B 1 and B 2 for which we want this condition to hold. We think that the most intuitive approach is to impose this for every B 1 ∈ P / 0 (X 1 ) and B 2 ∈ P / 0 (X 2 ), and will call this epistemic subset-independence. However, this is not what is usually done. The conventional approach, which we will refer to as epistemic value-independence, is to focus on singleton events of the type B 1 = {x 1 } and B 2 = {x 2 }; see for example (Walley, 1991) and (de Cooman and Miranda, 2012) . We believe this conventional approach to be flawed and will argue against it further on. Until then, we postpone this debate by adopting a very general approach that subsumes the former two as special cases. In particular, for every i ∈ {1, 2}, we simply fix a generic set of conditioning events B i ⊆ P / 0 (X i ). Epistemic value-independence corresponds to choosing B i = X i , whereas epistemic subset-independence corresponds to choosing B i = P / 0 (X i ). For sets of desirable gambles, this leads us to the following definition.
Definition 12 Let D be a coherent set of desirable gambles on X 1 × X 2 . Then D is epistemically independent if, for any i and j such that {i, j} = {1, 2}:
For coherent lower previsions, as a prerequisite for defining epistemic independence, we require that the domain C ⊆ C (X 1 × X 2 ) is independent, by which we mean that for any i and j such that {i, j} = {1, 2}, any pair ( f i , B i ) ∈ C (X i ) and any event B j ∈ B j :
Other than that, we impose no restrictions on C ; its elements ( f , B) ∈ C are for example not restricted to the types that appear in Equation (7). As a result, the following definition of epistemic independence is applicable beyond the context of lower previsions. For example, by restricting the domain to indicators, we obtain a notion of epistemic independence that applies to conditional lower probabilities. A detailed discussion of these special cases, however, is left as future work.
Definition 13 Let C ⊆ C (X 1 × X 2 ) be an independent domain. A coherent conditional lower prevision P on C is then epistemically independent if, for any i and j such that {i, j} = {1, 2}:
Another important feature of this definition is that B j is not only irrelevant to unconditional local lower previsions of the form P( f i )-in the sense that P( f i ) = P( f i |B j )-but also to conditional local lower previsions such as P(
. This type of irrelevance is called h-irrelevance; see Cozman (2013) and De Bock (2015) . Note, however, that this feature is optional within our framework; it only appears when C is sufficiently large. If B i = X i for all ( f i , B i ) ∈ C , our definition reduces to the simple requirement that P( f i ) = P( f i |B j ).
The Independent Natural Extension
All of that being said, we are now finally ready to introduce our central object of interest, which is the independent natural extension. Basically, the question to which this concept provides an answer is always the same: given two local uncertainty models and an assessment of epistemic independence, what then should be the corresponding joint model? The answer, however, depends on the specific framework that is being considered. Within the framework of sets of desirable gambles, the local uncertainty models are coherent sets of desirable gambles. In particular, for each i ∈ {1, 2}, we are given a coherent set of desirable gambles D i on X i . The aim is to combine these local models with an assessment of epistemic independence to obtain a coherent set of desirable gambles D on X 1 × X 2 . The first requirement on D, therefore, is that it should have D 1 and D 2 as its marginals, in the sense that marg i (D) = D i for all i ∈ {1, 2}. The second is that D should be epistemically independent. If both requirements are met, D is called an independent product of D 1 and D 2 . The most conservative among these independent products is called the independent natural extension. If all we know is that D is epistemically independent and has D 1 and D 2 as its marginal models, then the safest choice for D-the only choice that does not require any additional assessments-is their independent natural extension, provided of course that it exists. In order to show that it always does, we let
The following result establishes that D 1 ⊗ D 2 is the independent natural extension of D 1 and D 2 .
Similar concepts can be defined for conditional lower previsions as well. In that case, the local uncertainty models are coherent conditional lower previsions. In particular, for every i ∈ {1, 2}, we are given a coherent conditional lower prevision P i on some freely chosen local domain
The aim is now to construct an epistemically independent coherent conditional lower prevision P on C ⊆ C (X 1 × X 2 ) that has P 1 and P 2 as its marginals, in the sense that P coincides with P 1 and P 2 on their local domain:
As before, a model that meets these criteria is then called an independent product, and the most conservative among them is called the independent natural extension. Clearly, in order for these notions to make sense, the global domain C must at least include the local domains C 1 and C 2 and must furthermore be independent in the sense of Equation (7). The definitions and results below take this for granted.
Definition 17 An independent product of P 1 and P 2 is an epistemically independent coherent conditional lower prevision on C that has P 1 and P 2 as its marginals.
Definition 18
The independent natural extension of P 1 and P 2 is the point-wise smallest independent product of P 1 and P 2 .
Here too, if all we know is that P is epistemically independent and has P 1 and P 2 as its marginal models, then the safest choice for P-the only choice that does not require any additional assessments-is the independent natural extension, provided that it exists. The following result establishes that it does, by showing that it is a restriction of the operator P 1 ⊗ P 2 , defined by
Theorem 19 The independent natural extension of P 1 and P 2 is the restriction of P 1 ⊗ P 2 to C .
Interestingly, as can be seen from this result, the choice of the joint domain C does not affect the resulting independent natural extension, in the sense that any C that includes ( f , B) will lead to the same value of (P 1 ⊗ P 2 )( f |B). For that reason, we will henceforth assume without loss of generality that C = C (X 1 × X 2 ).
On the Choice of Conditioning Events
The fact that the existence results in the previous section are valid regardless of the choice of B 1 and B 2 should not be taken to mean that this choice does not affect the model. In some cases, it most definitely does. In the remainder of this contribution, we will study the extend to which it does, and how it affects the properties of the resulting notion of independent natural extension.
As a first observation, we note that larger sets of conditioning events correspond to stronger assessments of epistemic independence, and therefore lead to more informative joint models. For example, as can be seen from Equations (8)- (10), adding events to B 1 and B 2 leads to a largermore informative-set of desirable gambles D 1 ⊗ D 2 . Similarly, as can be seen from Equation (11), it leads to a joint lower prevision that is higher-and therefore again more informative. There is one important exception to this observation though, which occurs when we add conditioning events that are a finite disjoint union of other conditioning events. In that case, the resulting notion of independent natural extension does not change.
Proposition 20
For each i ∈ {1, 2}, let B ′ i be a superset of B i that consists of finite disjoint unions of events in B i . Replacing B 1 by B ′ 1 and B 2 by B ′ 2 then has no effect on the resulting independent natural extension D 1 ⊗ D 2 or P 1 ⊗ P 2 .
As a particular case of this result, it follows that if B i is a finite partition of X i , we can replace it by the generated algebra-minus the empty event. As an even more particular case, if X 1 and X 2 are finite, we find that epistemic value-and subset-independence lead to the same notion of independent natural extension. For that reason, in the finite case, it does not really matter which of these two types of epistemic independence is adopted.
In the infinite case though, the difference does matter, and the debate between epistemic valueand subset-independence remains open. For lower previsions, Miranda and Zaffalon (2015) recently adopted epistemic value-independence in combination with Walley-coherence. Unfortunately, they found that the corresponding notion of independent natural extension does not always exist. They also considered the combination of epistemic value-independence with Williams-coherence, and argued that the resulting model was too weak. For the case of lower probabilities, Vicig (2000) adopted epistemic subset-independence in combination with Williams-coherence, showed that the corresponding independent natural extension always exists, and proved that it satisfies factorisation properties. Our results so far can be regarded as a generalisation of the existence results of Vicig (2000). As we are about to show, his factorisation results can be generalised as well.
Factorisation and External Additivity
When X 1 and X 2 are finite, the independent natural extension of two lower previsions P 1 and P 2 is well-known to satisfy the properties of factorisation and external additivity (de Cooman et al., 2011) . Factorisation, on the one hand, states that
where g is a non-negative gamble on X 1 , h is a gamble on X 2 and P 1 (g) := −P 1 (−g). By symmetry, the role of 1 and 2 can of course be reversed. External additivity, on the other hand, states that
where f and h are gambles on X 1 and X 2 , respectively. Compared to the properties that are satisfied by the joint expectation of a product measure of two precise probability measures, these notions of factorisation and external additivity are rather weak. For example, for a precise product measure, additivity is not 'external', in the sense that f and h do not have to be defined on separate variables, nor does factorisation require g to be non-negative. Nevertheless, even in this weaker form, these properties remain of crucial practical importance. For example, in the context of credal networks-Bayesian networks whose local models are imprecise-they turned out to be the key to the development of efficient inference algorithms; see for example de Cooman et al. (2010 ), De Bock and de Cooman (2014 ) and De Bock (2015 . Any notion of independent natural extension that aims to extend such algorithms to infinite spaces, therefore, should preserve some suitable version of Equations (12) and (13).
The aim of this section is to study the extent to which these equations are satisfied by the notion of independent natural extension that was developed in this paper. As we will see, the answer ends up being surprisingly positive.
For all i ∈ {1, 2}, let P i be a coherent conditional lower prevision on C i ⊆ C (X i ), let E i be its natural extension to C (X i ), and let B i be a subset of P / 0 (X i ). The independent natural extension of P 1 and P 2 then satisfies the following three properties, the first of which implies the other two as special cases.
Corollary 23 (External additivity) For any f ∈ G (X 1 ) and h ∈ G (X 2 ), we have that
In each of these results, if the local domains C 1 and C 2 are sufficiently large-that is, if they include the gambles that appear in the statement of the results-it follows from Proposition 11 that E i and E j can be replaced by P i and P j , respectively, and similarly for E i and P i . That being said, let us now go back to the question of whether or not Equations (12) and (13) can be generalised to the case of infinite spaces. For the case of external additivity, it clearly follows from Corollary 23 that the answer is fully positive. Furthermore, this conclusion holds regardless of our choice for B 1 and B 2 ; they can even be empty. For factorisation, the answer does depend on B 1 and B 2 . If we adopt epistemic subset-independence-that is, if we choose B 1 = P / 0 (X 1 ) and B 2 = P / 0 (X 2 )-it follows from Corollaries 5 and 22 that the answer is again fully positive, because P / 0 (X i )-measurability then holds trivially. If B 1 ∪ { / 0} and B 2 ∪ { / 0} are sigma fields, the answer remains fairly positive as well, because Proposition 3 then implies that it suffices for g to be measurable in the usual, measure-theoretic sense. If we adopt epistemic value-independence-that is, if we choose B 1 = X 1 and B 2 = X 2 -it is necessary for g to be X i -measurable, which is a rather strong requirement that easily fails. For that reason, we think that for the case of infinite spaces, when it comes to choosing between epistemic value-and subset-independence, the latter should be preferred over the former.
Conclusions and Future Work
The main conclusion of this work is that by combining Williams-coherence with epistemic subsetindependence, we obtain a notion of independent natural extension that always exists, and that furthermore satisfies factorisation and external additivity. For weaker types of epistemic independence, including epistemic value-irrelevance, the existence result and the external additivity property remain valid, but factorisation then requires measurability conditions.
We foresee several lines of future research. The first, which we expect to be rather straightforward, is to extend our results from the case of two variables to that of any finite number of variables. Next, these extended versions of our results could then be used to develop efficient algorithms for credal networks whose variables take values in infinite spaces, by suitably adapting existing algorithms for the finite case. On the more technical side, it would be useful to see whether our results can be extended to the case of unbounded functions. Finally, for variables that take values in Euclidean space, B 1 and B 2 could be restricted to the Lebesgue measurable events. Combined with an assessment of continuity, we think that this could lead to the development of a notion of independent natural extension that includes sigma additive product measures as a special case.
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Proof of Lemma 24 This follows trivially from Equations (1) and (2).
Proof of Proposition 3 Consider any B ⊆ P / 0 (X ) such that B * := B ∪ { / 0} is a sigma field and fix some g ∈ G ≥0 (X ).
We first prove the 'only if' part of the statement. So assume that g is B * -measurable in the measure-theoretic sense (Nielsen, 1997, Definition 10.1). It then follows from (Nielsen, 1997, Corollary 10.5) that {x ∈ X : g(x) ≥ r} ∈ B * = B ∪ { / 0} for all r ∈ Q ≥0 . Therefore, it follows from Proposition 4 that g is B-measurable in the sense of Definition 2.
We end by proving the 'if' part of the statement. So assume that g is B-measurable in the sense of Definition 2. This means that there is a sequence {g n } n∈N of simple B-measurable gambles in G ≥0 (X ) such that lim n→+∞ sup |g − g n | = 0. Then on the one hand, since lim n→+∞ sup |g − g n | = 0 implies that lim n→+∞ |g(x) − g n (x)| = 0 for all x ∈ X , we know that {g n } n∈N converges pointwise to g on X . On the other hand, for any n ∈ N, we know from Definition 1 that there are c 0 ∈ R ≥0 , m ∈ N 0 and, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , m}, c i ∈ R ≥0 and B i ∈ B, such that
Since I X = 1, and because B * is a sigma field and therefore includes X , we then find that g = ∑ m i=0 c i I B i , where, for all i ∈ {0, . . . , n}, B i ∈ B * . (Nielsen, 1997, Example 10.2) therefore implies that g n is a B * -measurable function in the measure-theoretic sense. Since this is true for every n ∈ N, and because {g n } n∈N converges pointwise to g on X , it now follows from (Nielsen, 1997, Corollary 10.11(a)) that g is B * -measurable in the measure-theoretic sense.
Proof of Proposition 4
Since g ≥ 0 is a gamble and therefore by definition bounded, there is some α ∈ Q >0 such that 0 ≤ g < α. Fix any n ∈ N and let g n ∈ G (X ) be defined by
For all x ∈ X , we then find that
which implies that |g(x) − g n (x)| ≤ α /n. Since this is true for every x ∈ X , this allows us to infer that sup |g − g n | ≤ α /n. Consider now any k ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}. Since k /nα ∈ Q ≥0 , it follows from our assumptions on g that A k is a finite union of pairwise disjoint events in B ∪ {X , / 0}. Therefore, there is some m k ∈ N and, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , m k }, some B k,i ∈ B ∪ {X , / 0} such that
Since this is true for every k ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}, it follows that g n = α /n ∑
Since g n is clearly non-negative, and because I X = 1 and I / 0 = 0, it now follows from Definition 1 that g n ∈ G ≥0 (X ) is a simple B-measurable gamble.
So, in summary then, for any fixed n ∈ N, we know that we can construct a simple B-measurable gamble g n ∈ G ≥0 (X ) such that sup |g − g n | ≤ α /n. Definition 2 therefore clearly implies that g is B-measurable.
Proof of Corollary 5 Immediate consequence of Proposition 4.

A.2 Proofs and Additional Material for Section 3
Contrary to what the length of this section of the appendix might suggest, it should be noted that many of the results in this section are essentially well-known. Historically, most of them date back to Williams (1975 Williams ( , 2007 . Our versions are basically just minor variations of his results, expressed in terms of lower previsions-instead of upper previsions-and without imposing structural constraints on the domain. Similar results can also be found in (Pelessoni and Vicig, 2009), although often without proof.
Lemma 25 For any A ⊆ G (X ), E (A ) is a coherent set of desirable gambles on X if and only if it satisfies D4.
Proof of Lemma 25 Since Equation (2) implies that E (A ) satisfies D1, D2 and D3, this follows trivially from Definition 6. Proof of Lemma 27 Consider any f ∈ G (X ) such that f / ∈ D ∪ {0}. Because of Lemma 25, it suffices to prove that E (D ∪ {− f }) satisfies D4. So consider any g ∈ G (X ) such that g ≤ 0. In the remainder of this proof, we show that
which implies that D does not satisfy D4, a contradiction. Hence, it follows that µ > 0, which implies that f = 1 /µ(λ h − g). Therefore, since h ∈ D and −g ≥ 0, it follows from the coherence of D that f = 0 (if λ = 0 and g = 0) or f ∈ D. In both cases, we contradict our assumptions.
Proof of Proposition 9 Consider any conditional lower prevision P on C ⊆ C (X ).
We start by proving the 'only if' part of the statement. So let us assume that P is coherent. According to Definition 8, this implies that there is a coherent set of desirable gambles D on X such that P D coincides with P on C . We need prove that P is real-valued and that it satisfies Equation (4).
We begin by establishing that P is real-valued. So fix any ( f , B) ∈ C . For all µ ∈ R such that µ < inf f , it then follows from the coherence of D-and D1 in particular-that
Similarly, for all µ ∈ R such that µ > sup f , it follows from D4 that [ f − µ]I B / ∈ D. Hence, we find that inf f ≤ P D ( f |B) ≤ sup f . Since f is a gamble and therefore by definition bounded, this implies that P D ( f |B) is real-valued, which in turn implies that P( f |B) is real-valued because P D coincides with P on C . Since ( f , B) ∈ C was arbitrary, this means that P is real-valued.
Next, we show that P satisfies Equation (4). Fix any n ∈ N 0 , choose any λ 0 , . . . , λ n ∈ R ≥0 and  ( f 0 , B 0 ) , . . . , ( f n , B n ) ∈ C , let B := ∪ n i=0 B i and let h ∈ G (X ) be defined by
We need to prove that sup x∈B h(x) ≥ 0. In order to do that, we start by fixing some ε > 0. Let ε 0 := ε.
Since P D coincides with P on C , it then follows from Equation (3) that
Similarly, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, Equation (3) implies that there is some ε i ≥ 0 such that ε i ≤ ε and
Now let g :
Since D is coherent and therefore satisfies D2 and D3, it then follows from Equation (15) that
If λ 0 = 0, this implies that 0 ∈ D, which contradicts D4. If λ 0 > 0, this implies that g 0 ∈ D because of D2, which contradicts Equation (14). Since both cases lead to a contradiction, we conclude that g / ∈ D. Since the coherence of D implies that G >0 (X ) ⊆ D, this allows us to infer that g / ∈ G >0 (X ). Since g(x) = 0 for all x ∈ X \ B, this implies that inf x∈B g(x) ≤ 0. Hence, we find that
Since this is true for every ε > 0, it follows that sup x∈B h(x) ≥ 0, as desired.
It remains to prove the 'if' part of the statement. So let us assume that P is real-valued and that it satisfies Equation (4). We need to prove that P is coherent.
Let A P and E (P) be defined by Equation (5). We start by proving that E (P) is a coherent set of desirable gambles on X . Fix any f ∈ E (P). We then know from Equations (1), (2) and (5) 
for some n ∈ N 0 and m ∈ N such that n ≤ m, with λ 1 , . . . , λ m ∈ R >0 , f n+1 , . . . , f m ∈ G >0 (X ), and ( f 1 , B 1 ), . . . , ( f n , B n ) ∈ C and µ 1 , . . . , µ n ∈ R such that µ i < P( f i |B i ) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. We consider two cases: (16) and (4) that
it follows from Equations
which implies that f ≤ 0. Hence, in both cases, we find that f ≤ 0. Since f ∈ E (P) is arbitrary, this implies that E (P) satisfies D4. Since E (P) := E (A P ), it now follows from Lemma 25 that E (P) is a coherent set of desirable gambles on X . In the remainder of this proof, we will show that P E (P) coincides with P on C . Since E (P) is a coherent set of desirable gambles on X , Definition 8 then implies that P is coherent, as desired. So fix any ( f , B) ∈ C . We need to prove that P( f |B) = P E (P) ( f |B). However, since Equation (5) implies that [ f − µ]I B ∈ E (P) for all µ < P( f |B), it follows trivially from Equation (3) that P( f |B) ≤ P E (P) ( f |B). Therefore, it remains to prove that P( f |B) ≥ P E (P) ( f |B).
Consider any µ ∈ R such that [ f − µ]I B ∈ E (P). We then know from Equations (1), (2) and (5) that
for some n ∈ N 0 and m ∈ N such that n ≤ m, with λ 1 , . . . , λ m ∈ R >0 , f n+1 , . . . , f m ∈ G >0 (X ), and ( f 1 , B 1 ), . . . , ( f n , B n ) ∈ C and µ 1 , . . . , µ n ∈ R such that µ i < P( f i |B i ) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Therefore, if we let A := B ∪ ∪ n i=1 B i = / 0, we find that
where the first inequality follows from Equation (17) and the last inequality follows from Equation (4). Since λ i > 0 and µ i − P( f i |B i ) < 0, this implies that µ ≤ P( f |B). Since this true for every µ ∈ R such that [ f − µ]I B ∈ E (P), it follows from Equation (3) that P E (P) ( f |B) ≤ P( f |B).
Proof of Proposition 10
Consider any coherent set of desirable gambles D on X such that P D coincides with P on C . Since P is coherent, we know from Definition 8 that there is at least one such set D. We start by proving that E (P) ⊆ D.
Fix any ( f , B) ∈ C and any µ < P( f |B). Since P D ( f |B) = P( f |B), we know that µ < P D ( f |B), and therefore, it follows from Equation (3) that there is some µ * ∈ R such that [ f − µ * ]I B ∈ D and µ < µ * ≤ P D ( f |B). Furthermore, since µ * > µ and B = / 0, we also know that
Since this is true for every ( f , B) ∈ C and µ < P( f |B), we infer that A P ⊆ D, and therefore, because of Lemmas 24 and 26, that
Next, since D is coherent and E (P) ⊆ D, it follows from Definition 6 that E (P) satisfies D4. Therefore, and because E (P) = E (A P ), it follows from Lemma 25 that E (P) is a coherent set of desirable gambles on X . Hence, it remains to prove that P E (P) coincides with P on C .
Fix any ( f , B) ∈ C . Then on the one hand, since E (P) ⊆ D, we have that
On the other hand, since we know from Equation (5) that [ f − µ]I B ∈ E (P) for all µ < P( f |B), it follows from Equation (3) that P E (P) ( f |B) ≥ P( f |B). Hence, we find that P E (P) ( f |B) = P( f |B).
Since ( f , B) ∈ C is arbitrary, this implies that P E (P) coincides with P on C .
Proposition 28 Let P be a coherent conditional lower prevision on C ⊆ C (X ). Then for any
C ′ ⊆ C (X ) such that C ⊆ C ′ ,
the restriction of E to C ′ is the pointwise smallest coherent conditional lower prevision on C ′ that coincides with P on C .
Proof of Proposition 28 Let P be a coherent conditional lower prevision on C ⊆ C (X ) and consider any C ′ ⊆ C (X ) such that C ⊆ C ′ . Then as we know from Proposition 10, E is a coherent conditional lower on C (X ) that coincides with P on C . Since it follows trivially from Definition 8 that restricting the domain of a coherent conditional lower prevision preserves its coherence, this implies that the restriction of E to C ′ is a coherent conditional lower prevision on C ′ that coincides with P on C . It remains to show that it is dominated by any other coherent conditional lower prevision on C ′ that coincides with P on C . So consider any coherent conditional lower prevision P ′ on C ′ that coincides with P on C . Because of Definition 8, this implies that there is a coherent set of desirable gambles D on X such that P D coincides with P ′ on C ′ . Since this clearly implies that P D coincides with P on C , it now follows from Proposition 10 that E (P) ⊆ D, which implies that E = P E (P) ≤ P D . Hence, since P D coincides with P ′ on C ′ , we find that E is dominated by P ′ on C ′ , as desired.
Proof of Proposition 11 Immediate consequence of Proposition 28.
Proposition 29 Let P be a coherent conditional lower prevision on C ⊆ C (X ). Then for any two gambles f , g ∈ G (X ), any two events A, B ∈ P / 0 (X ), any real number λ ∈ R and any sequence of gambles { f n } n∈N ⊆ G (X ), whenever the involved lower and upper previsions are well-defined, we have that
[boundedness]
Proof of Proposition 29 Let P be a coherent conditional lower prevision on C ⊆ C (X ) and let E be its natural extension to C (X ). We will prove that E satisfies LP1-LP7. Since we know from Proposition 28 that E coincides with P on C , this then implies that P satisfies LP1-LP7 on its domain-that is, whenever the expressions are well-defined. Since we know from Proposition 28 that E is coherent, it follows from Proposition 9 that E is real-valued and satisfies Equation (4), which means that it satisfies the notion of Williams coherence that is considered in Pelessoni and Vicig (2009) ) that E satisfies LP1-LP4. Consider now any B ∈ P / 0 (X ). Since the operator E(·|B) : G (X ) → R satisfies LP1-LP3, it is a coherent lower prevision in the sense of Walley. Therefore, it follows from (Walley, 1991, Section 2.6.1) that E(·|B) satisfies LP5-LP7. Since this is true for every B ∈ P / 0 (X ), it follows that E satisfies LP5-LP7 as well.
Proposition 30 Consider a set of events B ⊆ P / 0 (X ) that is closed under finite unions and let F ⊆ G (X ) be a linear space of gambles such that I B f ∈ F and I B ∈ F for every f ∈ F and B ∈ B. Now let C := {( f , B) : f ∈ F , B ∈ B}. Then a conditional lower prevision P on C is coherent if and only if it is real-valued and satisfies LP1-LP4.
Proof of Proposition 30
If P is coherent, we know from Proposition 9 that P is real-valued and from Proposition 29 that it satisfies LP1-LP4. So assume that P is real-valued and satisfies LP1-LP4. We need to prove that P is coherent.
Because of Proposition 9, it suffices to show for all n ∈ N 0 and all choices of λ 0 , . . . , λ n ∈ R ≥0 and (
with B := ∪ n i=0 B i . So let us consider any n ∈ N 0 , λ 0 , . . . , λ n ∈ R ≥0 and ( f 0 , B 0 ), . . . , ( f n , B n ) ∈ C and let B := ∪ n i=0 B i . Since B is a finite union of events in B and because B is closed under finite unions, we know that B ∈ B. Therefore, and because F is a linear space such that I B f ∈ F and I B ∈ F for all f ∈ F and B ∈ B, it now follows from (LP3) that
Hence, since we know from LP2 and LP4-and our assumptions on F and B-that
Corollary 31 A conditional lower prevision P on C (X ) is coherent if and only if it is real-valued and satisfies LP1-LP4.
Proof of Corollary 31 Immediate consequence of Proposition 30.
Definition 32 (Conditional prevision) A conditional prevision P on C ⊆ C (X ) is a conditional lower prevision on C that is self-conjugate, in the sense that
Definition 33 (Conditional linear prevision) A conditional linear prevision P on C ⊆ C (X ) is a coherent conditional prevision on C .
Proposition 34 Let P be a conditional linear prevision on C ⊆ C (X ). Then for any two gambles f , g ∈ G (X ), any two events A, B ∈ P / 0 (X ), any real number λ ∈ R and any sequence of gambles { f n } n∈N ⊆ G (X ), whenever the involved previsions are well-defined, we have that
Proof of Proposition 34 Because of definitions 32 and 33, we know that P is a coherent conditional lower prevision on C that satisfies Equation (19). Due to Proposition 29, this implies that P satisfies LP1-LP5. P1 and P5 follow trivially from LP1 and LP5, respectively. P2 holds because
where the first equality follows from LP2 and the second one follows from Equation (19). P3 holds because
where the inequalities follow from LP3 and the equalities follow from Equation (19). Finally, P4 holds because
where second equality follows from P2 and P3 and the third equality follows from LP4.
Proposition 35 Consider a set of events B ⊆ P / 0 (X ) that is closed under finite unions and let F ⊆ G (X ) be a linear space of gambles such that I B f ∈ F and I B ∈ F for every f ∈ F and B ∈ B. Now let C := {( f , B) : f ∈ F , B ∈ B}. Then a conditional prevision P on C is a conditional linear prevision on C if and only if it is real-valued and satisfies P1-P4.
Proof of Proposition 35
If P is a conditional linear prevision on C , we know from Proposition 30 that P is real-valued and from Proposition 34 that it satisfies P1-P4. So assume that P is real-valued and satisfies P1-P4. We need to prove that P is a conditional linear prevision on C .
Since P satisfies P1-P3, it clearly satisfies LP1-LP3 as well. P also satisfies LP4 because, for all f ∈ F and A, B ∈ P / 0 (X ) such that A ∈ B and / 0 = A ∩ B ∈ B, it follows from P2-P4 that
Since P is real-valued and satisfies LP1-LP4, and because we know from Definition 32 that P is a conditional lower prevision on C , Proposition 30 now implies that P is coherent. Therefore, it follows from Definition 33 that P is a conditional linear prevision on C .
Corollary 36 A conditional prevision P on C (X ) is a conditional linear prevision on C (X ) if and only if it is real-valued and satisfies P1-P4.
Proof of Corollary 36 Immediate consequence of Proposition 35.
Lemma 37 A conditional prevision on C (X ) is a conditional linear prevision on C (X ) if and only if it is real-valued and satisfies P1' and P2-P4, with
Proof of Lemma 37 Since P is a conditional prevision and therefore satisfies Equation (19), we see that P satisfies P1 if and only if it satisfies P1'. Therefore, the result follows from Corollary 36.
Proposition 38 A conditional lower prevision P on C ⊆ C (X ) is coherent if and only if there is a non-empty set P of conditional linear previsions on
The same is true if the infimum in this expression is replaced by a minimum.
Proof of Proposition 38
Let P be a coherent conditional lower prevision on C ⊆ C (X ). We first prove the 'only if' part of the statement. In order to do that, we let E be the natural extension of P to C (X ), and let E be the conditional upper prevision that corresponds to E. We will prove that there is a non-empty set P of conditional linear previsions on C (X ) such that
Since we know from Proposition 11 that E coincides with P on C , this then clearly implies the 'only if' part of the statement. Since we know from Proposition 11 that E is coherent, it follows from Proposition 9 that E is real-valued and satisfies Equation (4). Therefore, for all n ∈ N 0 and all choices of λ 0 , . . . , λ n ∈ R ≥0 and ( f 0 , B 0 ) , . . . , ( f n , B n ) ∈ C (X ), if we let B := ∪ n i=0 B i , we find that
Since this means that E satisfies condition (A*) in Williams (2007), it now follows from (Williams, 2007, Theorem 2, Definition 2 and Proposition 6) and Lemma 37 that there is a non-empty set P of conditional linear previsions on C (X ) such that
The first is equivalent to what we here call a conditional linear prevision on C (X ). Equation (21) now follows because, for all
where the second equality follows from Equation (22) and the third equality follows from Equation (19). We end by proving the 'if' part of the statement. So assume that there is some non-empty set P of conditional linear previsions on C (X ) that satisfies Equation (20). We will prove that P is real-valued and that, for all n ∈ N 0 and all choices of λ 0 , . . . , λ n ∈ R ≥0 and ( f 0 , B 0 ) 
with B := ∪ n i=0 B i . Proposition 9 then implies that P is coherent. Let us first prove that P is real-valued. Fix any ( f , B) ∈ C . For every P ∈ P, it then follows from Proposition 34 and Lemma 37 that inf x∈B ≤ P( f |B) ≤ sup x∈B f (x). Hence, since P is non-empty, it follows from Equation (20) that inf x∈B ≤ P( f |B) ≤ sup x∈B f (x). Since f is a gamble and therefore by definition bounded, this implies that P( f |B) is real-valued. Since this is true for every ( f , B) ∈ C , it follows that P is real-valued.
Finally, fix any n ∈ N 0 , any λ 0 , . . . , λ n ∈ R ≥0 and ( f 0 , B 0 ), . . . , ( f n , B n ) ∈ C , let B := ∪ n i=0 B i and consider any ε > 0. It then follows from Equation (20) that there is a conditional linear prevision P ∈ P on C (X ) such that λ 0 P( f 0 |B 0 ) ≤ λ 0 P( f 0 |B 0 ) + ε. Furthermore, for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, Equation (20) also implies that P( f i |B i ) ≥ P( f i |B i ). Hence, we find that
where the last inequality follows from Proposition 9 because we know from Definition 33 that P is coherent. Since ε > 0 is arbitrary, we obtain Equation (23), as desired.
A.3 Proofs and Additional Material for Section 5
A.3.1 THE SETS OF DESIRABLE GAMBLES PART
Proposition 39 D 1 ⊗ D 2 is a coherent set of desirable gambles on X 1 × X 2 .
Proof of Proposition 39
Because of Lemma 25, it suffices to prove D4. So consider any f ∈ D 1 ⊗ D 2 and assume ex absurdo that f ≤ 0. We will prove that this leads to a contradiction.
Since D 1 and D 2 are coherent, they are closed with respect to positive scaling and finite sums. Therefore, and because f ∈ D 1 ⊗ D 2 = E (A 1→2 ∪ A 2→1 ), it follows from Equations (9) and (10) that
with I and J finite-possibly empty-index sets, with B 1,i ∈ P / 0 (X 1 ) and f 2,i ∈ D 2 for all i ∈ I, with B 2, j ∈ P / 0 (X 2 ) and f 1, j ∈ D 1 for all j ∈ J, with g ≥ 0, and where g = 0 is only possible if |I| + |J| > 0.
Let us assume ex absurdo that |I| + |J| = 0. Then on the one hand, since we know that g = 0 is only possible if |I| + |J| > 0, it follows that g = 0. On the other hand, |I| + |J| = 0 also implies that I = J = / 0, and therefore, due to Equation (24), that f = g. Since g ≥ 0 and f ≤ 0, this in turn implies that g = 0, thereby contradicting the fact that g = 0. Hence, it follows that at least one of the two ex absurdo assumptions that we have so far made must be wrong. If f ≤ 0, then the proof is finished. For that reason, in the remainder of the proof, we can assume that |I| + |J| = 0, and therefore, that |I| + |J| > 0. The only ex absurdo assumption that still remains is that f ≤ 0. Now let {B 1,k } k∈K be the set consisting of those atoms of the algebra generated by {B 1,i } i∈I that belong to ∪ i∈I B 1,i and, for all k ∈ K, let f 2,k := ∑ i∈I : B 1,k ⊆B 1,i f 2,i . The following properties are then easily verified. First, since I is finite, K is also finite. Secondly, |K| = 0 if and only if |I| = 0. Thirdly, for all k ∈ K, we have that B 1,k ∈ P / 0 (X 1 ) and-since D 1 is coherent and therefore satisfies D3-that f 2,k ∈ D 1 . Fourthly,
. Fiftly, the events in {B 1,k } k∈K are pairwise disjoint. For this reason, without loss of generality, we can assume the events {B 1,i } i∈I in Equation (24) to be pairwise disjoint. A completely similar argument leads us to conclude that the events {B 2, j } j∈J in Equation (24) can be assumed to be pairwise disjoint, again without loss of generality.
If {B 1,i } i∈I is a partition of X 1 , then we let Y 1 := I. Otherwise, we let Y 1 := I ∪ {i * } and define B 1,i * := X 1 \ ∪ i∈I B 1,i . Similarly, we let Y 2 := J if {B 2, j } j∈J is a partition of X 2 , and let Y 2 := J ∪ { j * } and B 1, j * := X 2 \ ∪ j∈J B 2, j otherwise. Next, for every i ∈ I, we let h 2,i be a gamble on Y 2 , defined by
Similarly, for every j ∈ J, we let h 1, j be a gamble on Y 1 , defined by
Using these gambles on Y 1 and Y 2 , we now construct a real-valued function h on Y 1 × Y 2 , defined by
This function is non-positive, in the sense that h ≤ 0. In order to prove that, let us fix any y 1 ∈ Y 1 and y 2 ∈ Y 2 . It then follows from Equations (25) and (26) that
Since I i (y 1 ) can be non-zero for at most one i ∈ I and I j (y 2 ) can be non-zero for at most one j ∈ J, we know that each of the two summations on the right hand side contains at most one non-zero term. The suprema can therefore be moved outside of the summations, yielding h(y 1 , y 2 ) = sup
For the next step, we start by observing the following. For any x 1 ∈ B 1,y 1 and any i ∈ I, since the sets {B 1,i } i∈I are pairwise disjoint, we know that x 1 ∈ B 1,i if and only if y 1 = i, which implies that
. Similarly, for any x 2 ∈ B 2,y 2 and any j ∈ J, since the sets {B 2, j } j∈J are pairwise disjoint, we know that x 2 ∈ B 2, j if and only if y 2 = j, which implies that I j (y 2 ) = I B 2, j (x 2 ). As an immediate consequence, it follows that h(y 1 , y 2 ) = sup
Finally, in combination with Equation (24), this implies that h(y 1 , y 2 ) = sup
where, for the last inequality, we use the fact that f ≤ 0 and g ≥ 0. Since this true for every y 1 ∈ Y 1 and y 2 ∈ Y 2 , it follows that h ≤ 0. Now let A 1 := {h 1, j : j ∈ J} and A 2 := {h 2,i : i ∈ I} and assume ex absurdo that H 1 := E (A 1 ) and H 2 := E (A 2 ) are coherent sets of desirable gambles on Y 1 and Y 2 , respectively. We will prove that that is impossible, by constructing a probability mass function p on X 1 × X 2 such that the corresponding expectation of h is both non-positive and positive, thereby obtaining a contradiction. In order to do that, we borrow an argument of De Cooman and Miranda (2012, Proof of Proposition 15) that is based on a very useful lemma of them, which, in order to make this paper self-contained, is restated here in Lemma 40.
Since H 1 is a coherent set of desirable gambles on Y 1 , it follows from Definition 6-and D4 in particular-that 0 / ∈ H 1 = E (A 1 ). Therefore, and because Y 1 and J-and hence also A 1 -are finite, it follows from Lemma 40 that there is a probability mass function p 1 on Y 1 such that p 1 (y 1 ) > 0 for all y 1 ∈ Y 1 and ∑ y 1 ∈Y 1 p 1 (y 1 )h 1, j (y 1 ) for all j ∈ J. Using a completely analogous argument, we also infer that there is a probability mass function p 2 on Y 2 such that p 2 (y 2 ) > 0 for all y 2 ∈ Y 2 and ∑ y 2 ∈Y 2 p 2 (y 2 )h 2,i (y 2 ) for all i ∈ I.
We now let p be the probability mass function on Y 1 × Y 2 that is defined by p(y 1 , y 2 ) := p 1 (y 1 )p 2 (y 2 ) for all y 1 ∈ Y 1 and y 1 ∈ Y 2 , and we let E p (h) be the expectation of h with respect to p, as defined by
Then on the one hand, since h ≤ 0, we have that E p (h) ≤ 0. On the other hand, however, it follows from Equation (27) that
For every i ∈ I, it follows from the properties of p 1 that the corresponding term in this summation is positive. Similarly, for every j ∈ J, it follows from the properties of p 2 that the corresponding term in this summation is strictly positive. Since |I| + |J| > 0, this implies that E p (h) > 0, thereby contradicting the fact that E p (h) ≤ 0. Hence, it follows that one of the two remaining ex absurdo assumptions is wrong. If f ≤ 0, then the proof is finished. Therefore, in the remainder of the proof, we can assume that there is at least one i ∈ {1, 2} for which H i is incoherent. Without loss of generality, symmetry allows us to assume that i = 1, that is, that H 1 is incoherent. The only ex absurdo assumption that still remains is that f ≤ 0.
Since H 1 is incoherent, it follows from Lemma 25 that there is some h * ∈ H 1 such that h * ≤ 0. Furthermore, since h * ∈ H 1 , Equation (2) implies that h * = λ g * + ∑ j∈J λ j h 1, j , for some λ ∈ R ≥0 and g * ∈ G >0 (Y 1 ) and, for all j ∈ J, some λ j ∈ R ≥0 , with λ + ∑ j∈J λ j > 0. If λ j = 0 for all j ∈ J, then λ > 0 and g * = 1 /λh * ≤ 0, which is impossible because g * ∈ G >0 (Y 1 ). Therefore, we know that there is at least one j ∈ J such that λ j > 0. Now let f 1 := ∑ j∈J λ j f 1, j and fix any x * 1 ∈ X 1 . Since the events in {B 1,y 1 } y 1 ∈Y 1 are pairwise disjoint, there will then be a unique y * 1 ∈ Y 1 such that x * 1 ∈ B 1,y *
1
. For this particular choice of y * 1 , we then find that
where the first equality follows from Equation (26) and the second inequality follows from the fact that h * ≤ 0, λ ≥ 0 and g * ∈ G >0 (Y 1 ). Since this is true for every x * 1 ∈ X 1 , we infer that f 1 ≤ 0. However, on the other hand, since there is at least one j ∈ J such that λ j > 0, and because f 1, j ∈ D 1 for all j ∈ J, the coherence of D 1 implies that f 1 ∈ D 1 and therefore, because of D4, that f 1 ≤ 0. From this contradiction, it follows that one of our ex absurdo assumptions must be false. Since the only remaining ex absurdo assumption is that f ≤ 0, this concludes the proof. 
which, since marg 1 (D) = marg 1 (D⌋X 2 ), is equivalent to proving that, for all f 1 ∈ G (X 1 ) and
Since f 1 ∈ D 1 implies that f 1 (X 1 )I B 2 (X 2 ) ∈ A 2→1 ⊆ D for all B 1 ∈ B 2 ∪{X 2 }, the converse implication holds trivially. So consider any f 1 ∈ G (X 1 ) and
Since we know from Proposition 39 that D is coherent, this implies that f 1 = 0. It remains to prove that
is a coherent set of desirable gambles on X 1 because of Lemma 27, and therefore, if we let
it follows from Proposition 39 that
) is a coherent set of desirable gambles on X 1 × X 2 . Now on the one hand, since − f 1 ∈ D • 1 , it follows from Equation (28) that
which contradicts D4.
Proof of Theorem 16
Since we know from Proposition 41 that D 1 ⊗ D 2 is an independent product of D 1 and D 2 , it suffices to prove that any other such independent product of D 1 and D 2 is a superset of
So let D be any independent product of D 1 and D 2 . Definition 14 then implies that D is coherent and that A 1→2 ∪ A 2→1 ⊆ D. Hence, we find that
where the inclusion follows from Lemma 24 and the final equality from Lemma 26.
A.3.2 THE CONDITIONAL LOWER PREVISIONS PART
Proposition 42 P 1 ⊗ P 2 is a coherent conditional probability on C (X 1 × X 2 ).
Proof of Proposition 42
For all i ∈ {1, 2}, since P i is a coherent conditional lower prevision on C i , it follows from Proposition 10 that E (P i ) is a coherent set of desirable gambles on X i . Therefore, Proposition 39 implies that E (P 1 ) ⊗ E (P 2 ) is a coherent set of desirable gambles on X 1 × X 2 . The result now follows from Definition 8.
Proposition 43
Consider two indexes i and j such that {i, j} = {1, 2}. Then for any f i ∈ G (X i ) and B i ∈ P / 0 (X i ) and any B j ∈ B j , we have that
Proof of Proposition 43 For all i ∈ {1, 2}, since P i is a coherent conditional lower prevision on C i , it follows from Proposition 10 that E (P i ) is a coherent set of desirable gambles on X i . Therefore, we infer from Proposition 41 that E (P 1 ) ⊗ E (P 2 ) is an independent product of E (P 1 ) and E (P 2 ). For ease of notation, we now let P := P 1 ⊗P 2 and D := E (P 1 )⊗E (P 2 ). As we know from Equation (11), P is then equal to P D . Furthermore, since D is an independent product of E (P 1 ) and E (P 2 ), we know that D is epistemically independent and that it has E (P 1 ) and E (P 2 ) as its marginals. We are now ready to prove Equation (29). In order to do that, we fix any two indexes i and j such that {i, j} = {1, 2}, any f i ∈ G (X i ) and B i ∈ P / 0 (X i ) and any B j ∈ B j . We start by proving the first equality. Since D is epistemically independent, we know that
for all µ ∈ R, and therefore, we find that
Next, we prove the second equality of Equation (29). Since D has E (P 1 ) and E (P 2 ) as its marginals, we know that
using Equation 6 to establish the last equality.
Proposition 44 The restriction of P 1 ⊗ P 2 to C is an independent product of P 1 and P 2 .
Proof of Proposition 44
Since we know from Proposition 42 that P 1 ⊗ P 2 is a coherent lower prevision on C (X 1 × X 2 ), it follows from Definition 8 that its restriction to C is coherent as well. Due to Definition 17, it remains to show that this restriction of P 1 ⊗ P 2 to C is epistemically independent and that it coincides with P 1 and P 2 on their domain. Epistemic independence follows trivially from Definition 13 and Proposition 43. Hence, it remains to prove that the restriction of P 1 ⊗ P 2 to C coincides with P 1 and P 2 on their domain, or equivalently, that
So fix any i ∈ {1, 2} and ( f i , B i ) ∈ C i . We then find that indeed, as desired,
where the first equality follows from Proposition 43 and the second equality follows from Equation (6) and Proposition 10.
Proof of Theorem 19
Since we know from Proposition 44 that the restriction of P 1 ⊗ P 2 to C is an independent product of P 1 and P 2 , it suffices to prove that any other such independent product of P 1 and P 2 dominates P 1 ⊗ P 2 on C . So let P be any independent product of P 1 and P 2 . Definition 17 then implies that P is an epistemically independent coherent conditional lower prevision on C that coincides with P 1 and P 2 on their domain. Let A P be the corresponding set of gambles, as defined by Equation (5), and let D := E (P) = E (A P ). We then know from Proposition 10 that D is a coherent set of desirable gambles on X 1 × X 2 and that P D coincides with P on C . In the remainder of this proof, we will show that E (P 1 ) ⊗ E (P 2 ) ⊆ D. Because of Equation (11), this clearly implies that P D ( f |B) ≥ (P 1 ⊗ P 2 )( f |B) for all ( f , B) ∈ C . Since P D coincides with P on C , this implies that P dominates P 1 ⊗ P 2 on C , thereby concluding the proof.
Let D 1 := E (P 1 ) and let A 2→1 be the corresponding set of gambles on X 1 × X 2 , as defined by Equation (10). We will now prove that A 2→1 ⊆ D. So consider any f 1 ∈ D 1 and any B 2 ∈ B 2 ∪ {X 2 }. We need to prove that
it follows from Equation (1) that there are n ∈ N and, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, λ i ∈ R >0 and g i ∈
. As we will show, this gamble h i belongs to D. We consider two cases:
. Furthermore, since P coincides with P 1 on its domain, we also know that
In summary then, we have found that h i ∈ D for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Since
where the inclusion holds because D is coherent. Since this is true for every f 1 ∈ D 1 and every B 2 ∈ B 2 ∪ {X 2 }, it follows that A 2→1 ⊆ D. Using a completely analogous argument, it also follows that A 1→2 ⊆ D, with A 1→2 defined by Equation (9) for D 2 := E (P 2 ). Hence, we find that A 1→2 ∪ A 2→1 ⊆ D, and therefore, that
where the second equality follows from Equation (8), the inclusion follows from Lemma 24, and the last equality follows from Lemma 26.
A.4 Proofs and Additional Material for Section 6
Proof of Proposition 20 We only prove the result for D 1 ⊗ D 2 . The result for P 1 ⊗ P 2 then follows trivially from Equation (11).
Let D 1 ⊗ D 2 be the independent natural extension that corresponds to B 1 and B 2 , as defined by Equations (8) Fix any f 2 ∈ D 2 and B ′ 1 ∈ B ′ 1 ∪ {X 1 }. We will prove that f 2 (X 2 )I B ′ 1 (X 1 ) ∈ D 1 ⊗ D 2 . If B ′ 1 = X 1 , this follows trivially from Equations (8) and (9). Otherwise, it follows from our assumptions that there is some m ∈ N and, for all k ∈ {1, . . . , m}, some B 1,k ∈ B 1 such that B ′ 1 is a finite disjoint union of the events {B 1,k } 1≤k≤m , which implies that I B ′ 
using Lemma 24 for the inclusion and Lemma 26 and Proposition 39 for the last equality.
A.5 Proofs and Additional Material for Section 7
Lemma 45 For any f ∈ G (X 1 ) and h ∈ G (X 2 ) and any simple B 1 -measurable g ∈ G ≥0 (X 1 ), we have that (P 1 ⊗ P 2 )( f + gh) ≥ E 1 f + gE 2 (h) .
Proof of Lemma 45
Since g ∈ G ≥0 (X 1 ) is a simple B-measurable gamble, we know from Definition 1 that there are c 0 ∈ R ≥0 , n ∈ N 0 and, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, c i ∈ R ≥0 and B i ∈ B 1 , such that g = c 0 + ∑ n i=1 c i I B i . Furthermore, since we know from Proposition 42 that P 1 ⊗ P 2 is coherent, it follows from Proposition 29 that P 1 ⊗ P 2 satisfies LP2, LP3 and LP4. Finally, since E 2 is coherent, we know from Proposition 29 that it satisfies LP6. Therefore, we find that
where the first equality follows because g = c 0 + ∑ n i=1 c i I B i , where the first inequality follows because P 1 ⊗ P 2 satisfies LP3 and LP2, where the second equality follows from Proposition 43, and where the third equality follows because E 2 satisfies LP6 and P 1 ⊗ P 2 satisfies LP4.
Lemma 46 For any f ∈ G (X 1 ) and h ∈ G (X 2 ) and any simple B 1 -measurable g ∈ G ≥0 (X 1 ), we have that (P 1 ⊗ P 2 )( f + gh) ≤ E 1 f + gE 2 (h) .
Proof of Lemma 46
Since E 2 is a coherent conditional lower prevision on C (X 2 ), we know from Proposition 38 that there is a conditional linear prevision P 2 on C (X 2 ) such that P 2 (h) = E 2 (h) and P 2 ≥ E 2 . Similarly, since E 1 is a coherent conditional lower prevision on C (X 1 ), we know from Proposition 38 that there is a conditional linear prevision P 1 on C (X 1 ) such that P 1 f + gE 2 (h) = E 1 f + gE 2 (h) and P 1 ≥ E 1 . Consider now any i ∈ {1, 2}. We then know from Proposition 28 that E i coincides with P i on C i . Therefore, and because P i ≥ E i , we also know that P i dominates P i on C i . Due to Equation (5), this implies that A P i ⊆ A P i and therefore, using Lemma 24, also that E (P i ) ⊆ E (P i ). Since this is true for every i ∈ {1, 2}, it follows from Equation (8) and Lemma 24 that E (P 1 ) ⊗ E (P 2 ) ⊆ E (P 1 ) ⊗ E (P 2 ), and therefore, because of Equation (11), that P 1 ⊗ P 2 ≤ P 1 ⊗ P 2 .
The result can now be proved as follows. First, since P 1 ⊗ P 2 ≤ P 1 ⊗ P 2 , we find that
Secondly, since we know from Proposition 42 that (P 1 ⊗ P 2 ) is coherent, it follows from Proposition 29 that (P 1 ⊗ P 2 ) satisfies LP7, which implies that
using Lemma 45 for the second inequality. Finally, we also know that
where the first equality follows from Definitions 32 and 33 because P 1 and P 2 are conditional linear previsions, and where the second equality follows because P 2 (h) = E 2 (h) and P 1 f + gE 2 (h) = E 1 f + gE 2 (h) . By combining Equations (30)- (32), the result is now immediate.
Proposition 47 For any f ∈ G (X 1 ) and h ∈ G (X 2 ) and any simple B 1 -measurable g ∈ G ≥0 (X 1 ), we have that (P 1 ⊗ P 2 )( f + gh) = E 1 f + gE 2 (h) .
Proof of Proposition 47
Immediate consequence of Lemmas 45 and 46.
Proof of Theorem 21
Since g ∈ G ≥0 (X 1 ) is B 1 -measurable, we know from Definition 2 that there is a sequence {g n } n∈N of simple B 1 -measurable gambles in G ≥0 (X 1 ) such that g n converges uniformly to g. This also implies that f + g n E 2 (h) converges uniformly to f + gE 2 (h) and, since h is a gamble and therefore by definition bounded, that f + g n h converges uniformly to f + gh. The result now follows from the following series of equalities:
The first of these equalities holds because it follows from Propositions 42 and 29 that P 1 ⊗ P 2 satisfies LP5. The second equality follows from Proposition 47. The third equality holds because the coherence of E 1 allows us to infer from Proposition 29 that E 1 satisfies LP5.
Proof of Corollary 22
Let f := 0 ∈ G (X i ). We then know from Theorem 21 that (P 1 ⊗ P 2 )(gh) = (P 1 ⊗ P 2 )( f + gh) = E i f + gE j (h) = E i gE j (h) .
The result can now be inferred from the non-negative homogeneity-LP2-of E i that is implied by its coherence. If E j (h) ≥ 0, we simply apply the non-negative homogeneity for λ := E j (h). If E j (h) ≤ 0, we apply it for λ := −E j (h) and combine this with the fact that E i (g) := −E i (−g).
Proof of Corollary 23
Let g := 1. Then g belongs to G ≥0 (X 1 ) and is B 1 -measurable. Therefore, we know from Theorem 21 that (P 1 ⊗ P 2 )( f + h) = (P 1 ⊗ P 2 )( f + gh) = E 1 f + gE 2 (h) = E 1 f + E 2 (h) .
The result now follows from the constant additivity-LP6-of E 1 that is implied by its coherence.
